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Abstract 
The paper examines importance and disparities of personal income taxation in a context of a tax structure. The attention is 
focused on single worker taxation with the average wage in 21 selected European countries, OECD as well as the European 
Union members. Importance of personal income taxes is not only in their financial contribution to the public budgets (in average, 
personal income taxes are the second most important source of tax revenues in line with Eurostat tax classification), but also in 
their impact on other government policies and goals (e.g. an economic growth, a redistribution, country´s competitiveness, a 
functioning of labour markets or fiscal federalism) at the same time. Finally, paper explores relation between PIT share on total 
taxation and average PIT rate for a single worker with the average wage. Results indicate that increasing PIT share on total 
taxation by 1 percentage point increases the PIT rate by 0.57 percentage point. It confirms the importance of PIT rates for total 
tax revenues. Paper uses standard scientific method, e.g. description, comparison, analysis, synthesis. The OECD wage database, 
“Taxes in Europe” database and national statistical offices are the main data sources. 
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1. Introduction 
Personal income taxes are important source of public revenues as currently revenues from personal income taxes 
accounted nearly a quarter of total taxation on average, namely 24 % in OECD countries (OECD, 2013a) and 21 % 
in EU-27 (European Commission, 2013b). The tax structure is a very important aspect of the concept of the quality 
of taxation. It deals with the design of tax policy to achieve desired policy objectives, while at the same time 
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promoting economic growth, minimizing distortions and reducing the cost of tax collection (Lee and Gordon, 2005). 
With tax burdens differentiated by earnings level and family situation, they serve a central role as redistribution 
policies (Cordes and Juffras, 2012). Importantly, by shaping both work incentives and the cost of labour, the level 
and structure of these taxes are major influences on the functioning of labour markets (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2003 
or Brys, 2011). As personal income taxes contribute significantly to the overall tax burden on a labour, it is also 
relevant factor of international competitiveness (Paturot et al., 2013 or Szarowská, 2013). When subnational 
governments have tax competence to setting the PIT rates, it is clearly the most important aspect of their fiscal 
sovereignty (Yilmaz et al., 2012). Ability to set tax rates allows subnational governments to choose the level of 
public services while minimizing the compliance costs associated with collecting the required revenues.  
Albeit personal income taxation is fully within the competence of the individual countries even in the European 
Union, its evolution over time is issue that feature prominently in the political debate. 
The aim of the article is to examine disparities in personal income taxation with emphasis on single worker 
taxation with the average wage in 21 selected OECD as well as the EU members. The attention is also focused on 
the importance of the personal income taxes in a tax structure. 
2. Theoretical background 
The primary goal of taxation is to transfer resources from one group to another one to achieve certain 
development objectives without jeopardizing economic goals. Equity in taxation has both horizontal and vertical 
components. Horizontal equity is present when there is equal tax treatment of taxpayers who have equal capability to 
pay taxes. Vertical equity concerns the proper relationship between the relative tax burdens paid by individuals with 
different capacity to pay taxes. There is no formula for setting the proper degree of progressivity of taxation. It 
depends on factors such as the degree of inter individual solidarity in a society or the degree of shirking by potential 
recipients of transfers. From this point of view is necessary to always compare and examine the same groups of 
taxpayers. This article is focused on a single worker without children and related benefits and bonuses. 
Taxes are traditionally classified as direct (personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and other income and 
capital taxes) or indirect (VAT, excise duties and consumption taxes, other taxes on products and production). 
Generally, the first group allows greater redistribution as it is impractical to introduce progressivity in indirect taxes 
(Musgrave and Thin, 1948). Therefore, the recourse to direct taxes, which are more 'visible' to the electorate, tends 
to be greater in the countries where tax electorate, tends to be greater in the countries where tax redistribution 
objectives are more pronounced; this usually results also in higher top personal income tax rates. While 
policymakers cannot directly adjust the tax burden of income, but they can reform the statutory elements of the tax 
system, which ultimately determine average and marginal tax rates (Torres et al., 2012). 
When examining personal income taxation, it is necessary to point out differences in defined terms and used data. 
Table 1 reports category of taxes used in different international classification, namely in these data sources:  
x OECD classification 
x System of National Accounts (2008 SNA); 
x European System of Accounts (1995 ESA); 
x IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM2001). 
 
 Table 1. Comparison of the international classification of taxes  
OECD Classification  2008 SNA  1995 ESA  GFSM 2001 
1000 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains       
1100 Individuals 
1110 Income and profits  D51-8.61a  D51A  1 111 
1120 Capital gains D51-8.61c,  d D51C, D 1 111 
1200 Corporations 
1210 Income and profits  D51-8.61b  D51B  1 112 
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1220 Capital gains  D51-8.61c  D51C  1 112 
1300 Unallocable as between 1100 and 1200      1 113 
 
Another theoretical difference is in a method to estimate the allocation of the personal income tax. Most countries 
basically multiply individual income tax payments by proportions of the selected income sources in the total 
taxpayer's income (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland and 
Sweden). This is done both by way of micro-simulation models relying on samples from the total taxpayer 
population and by way of use of exhaustive tax return data sets (e.g. Belgium and Ireland). The corresponding 
estimates obtained at the taxpayer level are consequently aggregated to obtain estimates of the personal income tax 
raised in respect of the selected sources of income. For example, the total amount of personal income tax raised in 
respect of labour income, PIT could be estimated as follows: 
ܲܫܶ ൌ σ ൬ௐೕ௒ೕ ൰ כ ܲܫ ௝ܶ௝ ൌ σ ݓ௝௝ כ ܲܫ ௝ܶ  (1) 
where Wj measures the labour income of the j-th taxpayer in a sample of individuals (j = 1, …, n) and where PITj 
measures the personal income tax payment of the j-th taxpayer on his total taxable income Yj. The above equation 
(1) therefore measures the total personal income tax raised on labour income as a weighted average of each 
individual taxpayer's payment PIT, with the weights wj = (Wj/Yj) attached to these individual payments reflecting 
the distribution of total wages and salaries across taxpayers.  
As shown in Table 2, in some countries (Spain, Italy and Greece) instead use tax return data that is aggregated at 
the level of a number of income classes or income tax brackets (j = 1, …, n), but essentially make the same 
calculations. The latter approach is likely to capture broadly comparable effects of the differences in tax treatment 
and the distribution of income sources across different groups of taxpayers.  
Table 2. Methods to estimate the allocation of the personal income tax 
Countries Data Basic method 
BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, HU (from 
2009), IE, LU, NL, PL, SE, SI 
Data set of individual taxpayers  PIT payments multiplied by fractions of net taxable income sources (as 
percentage of the total tax base) at the level of the individual taxpayer  
UK Data set of individual taxpayers  Income source specific income tax rates multiplied by net taxable 
income sources at the level of the individual taxpayer  
EL, ES, IT Income class data based on data 
set of individual taxpayers  
PIT payments multiplied by fractions of net taxable income sources (as 
percentage of the total tax base) at the level of income classes/tax 
brackets  
AT, CZ, EE, HU (before 2009), 
PT 
Tax receipts from withholding 
and income tax statistics  
Approach using aggregate withholding tax and final assessment income 
tax data with certain adjustments. 
 
Countries as Austria or Portugal choose another approach and use tax receipts data from the wage (withholding) 
tax and (final) income tax statistics and apply a number of adjustments. Wage (withholding) tax is by its very nature 
designed to approximate the final income tax liability for wage earners as closely as possible, but in some cases 
there are certain adjustments for income tax assessments, because the wage tax withheld is not correct (e.g. because 
of different jobs or pensions during a single year). As this correction concerns only wage earners, in some cases the 
net amount of the correction is deducted from the total amount of recorded wage tax and, the amount of personal 
income tax is adjusted accordingly. Since wage tax can also be levied on social benefits (e.g. unemployment 
benefits, widower's benefits and invalidity benefits) or old-age pensions, the recorded wage tax is adjusted 
accordingly. The (adjusted) personal income tax is further split between income from self-employed businesses and 
capital income, either using aggregate proportions or information aggregated at the level of income classes 
(Austria). The latter approach is also likely to capture broadly comparable effects of the differences in tax treatment 
and the distribution of income sources across different groups of taxpayers as outlined above. Finally, Hungary 
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(from 2009 onwards) uses a combination of micro simulation and a correction on the aggregate figures from the 
micro simulation model.  
While in most countries the personal income tax system is comprehensive in the sense that all subcategories of 
taxable income are pooled at the individual level, and the result is taxed at ascending statutory tax rates. However, 
some countries apply a given statutory rate on a specific income category, as can occur under a 'dual income tax' 
system. In the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, for example, capital income is currently taxed at a relatively lower 
statutory rate as compared to other earned income. In most cases, however, the tax receipts data are used to isolate 
the amount of tax collected on that particular income category. In Slovenia, capital income is taxed according to a 
flat rate while active income is taxed according to a progressive rate. In the United Kingdom, the personal income 
tax law actually prioritises the order of different types of income. For example, labour income is treated as the 
bottom of the taxable income and dividend income is treated as the top slice of taxable income. Unlike the method 
used in other countries, the United Kingdom calculation therefore does not assume that the individual taxpayer has 
the same average effective income tax rate over all income sources (see also above). Instead, income source specific 
income tax rates are multiplied by the selected income sources at the taxpayer level.  
Finally used terms should be defined. The article explores average rate of personal income tax (PIT). It is amount 
of income tax payable after accounting for any reliefs calculated on the basis of the tax provisions divided by gross 
wage earnings.  
3. Used data 
The goal of the article is to examine personal income taxation with emphasis on a single worker taxation and on 
taxation of average wage in selected European countries. The empirical estimation is performed for 21 OECD and 
EU member states, namely Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), FI 
(Finland), FR (France), Germany (DE), EL (Greece), Hungary (HU), IE (Ireland), IT (Italy), Luxembourg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), ES (Spain), Sweden (SE), and United 
Kongdom (UK). The analysis is based on annual data in a period 1995–2012 or in year 2012(it is the latest year with 
available data). The OECD wage database and Eurostat “Taxes in Europe” database are the main data sources. 
It is assumed that annual income from employment is equal to a given ratio of the average full-time adult gross 
wage earnings for each economy; it is referred to as the average wage (AW). This covers both manual and non-
manual workers for either industry Sectors C-K inclusive with reference to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities or industry Sectors B-N inclusive with reference to the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (for details look at OECD, 2013b). 
4. Results 
As mentioned, tax structures are measured by the share of major taxes in total tax revenue. While, on average, tax 
levels have generally been rising, the share of main taxes in total revenues– the tax structure or tax mix – has been 
remarkably stable over time. Although revenues from personal income taxes fell to 24 % of total taxes on average in 
2012 compared with 30 % in the mid-1980s, they are still the second most important tax source (the main is SC).  
Fig.1 presents percentage share of major tax categories on total tax revenue in selected countries in 2012 (it is the 
latest year with available data). Figure depicts following groups of taxes: direct taxes divided into personal income 
tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and other direct taxes (Dto), social contributions (SC) and indirect taxes 
(IndT) in line with classification of European Commission (2013). Countries are sorted by the PIT share on total 
taxation from the smallest to the highest value. 
 Generally, examined countries have a different structure of tax revenues (tax mix). In particular, while most 
countries raise roughly equal shares of revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social contributions, especially 
the new EU member states, typically display a lower share of direct taxes in the total (see Fig.1). The disparities are 
in percentage share of PIT on total taxation as well. The percentage share varies from the 8.3 % of the total tax 
revenues in the Slovak Republic to the 50.6 % of the total tax revenues in Denmark. Very low shares on personal 
income taxes are recorded also in the Czech Republic (10.8 %) and Hungary (13.2 %). All of these countries (SK, 
CZ, HU) have adopted flat rate systems, which typically induce a stronger reduction in direct than indirect tax rates.  
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Fig. 1. Share of major tax categories in total tax revenue in 2012. 
The Nordic countries (FI, SE, DK) as well as Belgium and Ireland have relatively high shares of personal income 
taxes (and generally direct taxes) in total tax revenues. Finland collects 29.4 % of total tax revenues from PIT, 
Sweden 33.8 % and Belgium 28.2 %. The noticeable increase is evidenced in Ireland (32 % in 2012 instead of 
26.9 % in 2012), this increase can be attributed to developments in public debt and financing liabilities related to the 
banking sector. 
As results from many studies (e.g. Paturot et al., 2013), personal income taxes contribute significantly to the 
overall tax burden on a labour, and it is relevant factor of international competitiveness. Fig. 2 shows that the tax 
wage concerning total labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay for the average single 
workers varied between Belgium (56 %) and Ireland (26 %) in 2012. The tax wage was around 50 % in France 
(50.2 %), Germany (49.7 %) and Hungary (49.4 %), and under 40 % in the Slovak Republic (39.6 %), the 
Netherlands and Denmark (both 38.6 %), Portugal (36.7 %), Luxembourg (35.8 %), Poland (35.5 %) and United 
Kingdom (32.3 %). The average tax wage was 41.8 % of total labour cost in a whole group of selected countries in 
2012 (column AV). 
 
 
Fig. 2. The components of the tax wage as a % of labour costs in 2012. 
The percentage of labour costs paid in personal income tax varies considerably within chosen countries. The 
lowest are in Poland (5.8) and the Slovak Republic (7.4 %). The highest values are in Denmark (36.2 %), followed 
by Belgium (22.1 %). The percentage of labour costs paid in employee social security contributions also varies 
widely ranging from 2.7 % in Denmark and 2.9 % in Ireland to 19 % in Slovenia. There is a specific reason for the 
extremely low share of social contributions in Denmark: most welfare spending is financed out of general taxation. 
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This requires high direct tax levels and indeed the share of direct taxation to total tax revenues in Denmark is by far 
the highest in the European Union. 
Employers in France pay 30.6 % of total labour costs in social security contributions, the highest amongst chosen 
countries. The corresponding figures are also more than 20 % in next countries - Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. As a percentage of labour costs, 
the total of employee and employer social security contributions exceeds one-third of total labour costs in seven 
countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece and Hungary (OECD, 2013b).  
It is important to remind that average personal income taxes are considerably influenced by the system of basic 
tax allowances and tax credits as well as the system of income progressivity. First, the progressivity of the PIT 
depends on the progressivity of the statutory PIT rate schedule, which depends on the number and width of the tax 
brackets and on the difference between the tax rates and especially between the top and bottom tax rate. Second, the 
progressivity also depends on the specific design of PIT provisions that reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability. 
Provisions can take the form of allowances, deductions, exemptions and credits and may depend on the level of 
income (e.g. in-work tax credits and other make-work-pay provisions) and/or specific family characteristics (e.g. the 
number of children, a dependent spouse, etc.). Third, flat rates tend to reduce the progressivity of the tax system. 
Table 3 shows personal income tax and the gross wage earnings of the average worker in analyzed countries for 
2012. To have comparable data, presented results are calculated for the average wage (AW) and its different levels.  
Table 3. Personal income tax on gross income (single worker) 
 
AW 
national 
currency 
AW in USD 
based on 
PPP 
share PIT Ranking 
PIT rate 
67 % 
AW 
Ranking 
PIT rate 
100 % 
AW 
Ranking 
PIT rate 
167 % 
AW 
Ranking 
AT   40 855   48 187 23.17 13 9.9 10 15.9 11 22.9 11 
BE   46 065   53 047 28.19 17 22.4 20 28.8 20 35.5 20 
CZ   300 421   21 793 10.79 2 7.7 7 11.8 6 15.1 3 
DE   44 811   56 058 21.76 11 11.8 11 17.5 15 22.3 10 
DK   392 456   49 887 50.64 21 14.2 14 19.2 17 27.8 14 
EE   10 950   19 866 16.14 7 33.4 21 36.2 21 43.4 21 
EL   20 086   28 846 14.65 5 14.8 15 21.8 19 29.0 18 
ES   25 558   36 162 23.38 14 6.4 6 11.0 5 16.7 5 
FI   41 478   44 148 29.41 18 15.4 17 17.1 14 18.4 8 
FR   36 673   42 494 17.90 8 4.6 1 8.9 2 15.4 4 
HU  2 749 566   20 875 13.26 3 12.6 12 14.6 7 20.9 9 
IE   32 626   39 042 31.99 19 16.0 18 16.5 12 18.0 7 
IT   28 908   36 563 27.07 15 8.7 9 14.8 8 28.0 15 
LU   51 312   54 211 22.18 12 17.2 19 21.3 18 28.3 16 
NL   46 418   55 640 20.94 10 7.9 8 15.5 9 23.8 13 
PL   38 910   20 591 13.77 4 5.1 3 16.6 13 28.8 17 
PT   15 720   25 341 18.53 9 5.8 4 6.8 1 7.6 1 
SE   387 294   43 685 33.83 20 5.9 5 9.4 3 12.3 2 
SI   17 227   26 793 14.98 6 15.1 16 17.9 16 30.4 19 
SK    9 821   18 511 8.83 1 4.9 2 10.7 4 17.8 6 
UK   35 883   52 720 27.89 16 13.2 13 15.5 10 23.1 12 
    
The average share of PIT on total tax revenues is 22.35 % and it varies from 8.83 % in the Slovak Republic to 
50.64 % in Denmark. Notable differences are in the PIT value corresponding to the average wage taxation. The PIT 
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rate varies very substantially within the chosen countries, ranging from a minimum of 6.8 % in Poland to a 
maximum of 36.2 % in Denmark. The lowest rates are observed in Greece (8.9 %), the Slovak Republic (9.4 %), 
Portugal (10.7 %), Slovenia (11 %) and in the Czech Republic (11.8 %). The average PIT is 16.56 % in a whole 
group. Very high rates are detected in Italy (21.3 %), Finland (21.8 %) and Belgium (28.8 %). Table 3 also brings 
PIT for 67 %, 133 % and 167 % of the average wage. Obtained values express progressivity of PIT and results 
mostly from applied number and width of the tax brackets and on the difference between the tax rates and especially 
between the top and bottom tax rate. The biggest difference between PIT rates is noticed in Greece and the United 
Kingdom. As was already mentioned, personal income taxation is often used as a tool of redistribution policy. It is 
obvious that the impact from cash benefits on progressivity tends to be stronger at low and middle income levels. 
Detailed analysis of PIT progressivity will be subject of a future paper. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Relation between share PIT on total taxation and PIT in % (single worker, average wage). 
Finally, the intent of the paper is to find relation between PIT share on total taxation and average PIT rate for a 
single worker with the average wage. As known, total tax revenues are mostly influenced by the tax rate and the tax 
base. Fig. 3 indicates that increasing PIT share on total taxation by 1 percentage point increases the PIT rate by 0.57 
percentage point. Coefficient of determination (R2) is relatively high (0.66) due to expected impact of a tax base. It 
confirms a key importance of PIT rates for a total tax revenues and a position of personal income taxation in a tax 
mix. 
5. Conclusion 
The goal of the article was to examine importance of personal income taxation in a context of a tax quota and 
with emphasis on single worker taxation with the average wage in selected European countries. The empirical 
estimation was performed for 21 OECD and EU member states, annual data were taken from OECD wage database, 
Eurostat online database “Taxes in Europe” and national statistical offices. 
Importance of personal income taxes is not only in their financial contribution to the public budgets (personal 
income taxes are the second most important source of tax revenues in line with Eurostat tax classification), but also 
in their impact on other government policies and goals (e.g. an economic growth, a redistribution, country’s 
competitiveness, a functioning of labour markets or fiscal federalism) at the same time.  
Generally, examined countries have a different structure of tax revenues (tax mix). In particular, while most 
countries raise roughly equal shares of revenues from direct taxes, indirect taxes, and social contributions, especially 
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the new EU member states, typically display a lower share of direct taxes in the total tax structure. Differences are in 
percentage share of PIT on total taxation as well. The percentage share varies from the 8.3 % of the total tax 
revenues in the Slovak Republic to the 50.6 % of the total tax revenues in Denmark. Very low shares on personal 
income taxes are recorded also in the Czech Republic (10.8 %) and Hungary (13.2 %). These countries (SK, CZ and 
HU) have adopted flat rate systems, which induce a stronger reduction in direct than indirect tax rates. Calculated 
PIT rates for 67 %, 133 % and 167 % of the average wage prove progressivity of PIT and result especially from 
applied number and width of the tax brackets and on the difference between the tax rates and the top and bottom tax 
rate.  
Finally, the paper explores relation between PIT share on total taxation and average PIT rate for a single worker 
with the average wage. Results indicate that increasing PIT share on total taxation by 1 percentage point increases 
the PIT rate by 0.57 percentage point. It confirms an importance of PIT rates for total tax revenues.  
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